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Race and the New Policing
Jeffrey Fagan*
Several observers credit nearly 25 years of declining crime 
rates to the “New Policing” and its emphasis on advanced 
statistical metrics, new forms of organizational accountability, 
and aggressive tactical enforcement of minor crimes. This 
model has been adopted in large and small cities, and has 
been institutionalized in everyday police-citizen interactions, 
especially among residents of poorer, often minority, and higher-
crime areas. Citizens exposed to these regimes have frequent 
contact with police through investigative stops, arrests for minor 
misdemeanors, and non-custody citations or summons for code 
violations or vehicle infractions. Two case studies show surprising 
and troubling similarities in the racial disparities in the new 
policing in vastly different areas, including more frequent police 
contact and new forms of monetary punishment. Low-level 
“public order” crimes and misdemeanors are the starting point 
for legal proceedings that over time evolve into punishments 
leading to criminal records with lasting consequences. In these 
regimes, warrants provide the entry point for processes that move 
from civil fines to criminal punishment. The chapter concludes 
with a menu of reforms to disincentivize the new policing while 
creating new forms of accountability to mitigate its harms.
 
 
 
 
 
* Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, and Professor of Epidemiology, Columbia 
University. Fagan was consultant to the U.S. Department of Justice, Special Litigation Section, in 
the investigation of the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department. He also was expert for Plaintiffs 
in Floyd v. City of New York challenging the constitutionality of the stop and frisk program of the 
New York City Police Department. The author wishes to thank the workshop participants at the 
Academy for Justice conference on criminal justice reform for very helpful comments. Nicola 
Anna Cohen and Chris E. Mendez provided outstanding research assistance. All opinions and 
any errors are those of the author alone. Portions of this chapter appeared in Jeffrey Fagan & 
Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation, 105 GEO. L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2017).
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INTRODUCTION
In popular and political culture, many observers credit nearly 25 years of 
declining crime rates to the “New Policing.”1 Breaking with a past tradition 
of “reactive policing,” the New Policing emphasizes advanced statistical 
metrics, new forms of organizational accountability, and aggressive tactical 
enforcement of public-order crimes or violations.2 The existing scholarship 
on the new policing has focused mainly on the nation’s major cities, where 
high population density, elevated crime rates, and sizable police forces provide 
pressurized laboratories for police experimentation, often in the spotlight of 
political scrutiny.
This scholarship has generally overlooked how the New Policing has been 
woven into the social, political, and legal fabrics of smaller, less densely populated 
areas. These areas are characterized by more intimate and individualized 
relationships among citizens, courts, and police, as well as closely spaced local 
boundaries with a considerable flow of persons through small administrative 
entities such as villages and towns. Crime rates rarely approach those of urban 
centers, although these places are hardly strangers to violence or other crime.3 
New attention to crime in the smaller areas followed the 2014 Department of 
Justice investigation into policing in Ferguson, Missouri, which revealed how 
the New Policing unfolds in these less densely populated areas.4
These two policing contexts showed that the differences are far less than 
one might imagine. Residents of cities have frequent contact with police in the 
form of stop-and-frisk encounters—investigative stops or field interrogations 
based on low levels of suspicion.5 High rates of citations (summons) and 
1. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 413–14 (2000); 
see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND 
ITS CONTROL x–xi (2011). For a review, see Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 
1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 171–81 
(2004).
2. See WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP 
COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 239 (1998); CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY: 
INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST COUNTERTERROR FORCE—THE NYPD 106 (2010); GEORGE L. KELLING 
& CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME 
IN OUR COMMUNITIES 188–91 (1996).
3. See generally Allen E. Liska, John R. Logan & Paul E. Bellair, Race and Violent Crime in the 
Suburbs 63 AMER. SOC. REV. 27 (1998).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2–6 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
5. See Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, “Stop-and-Frisk,” in the present Volume; 
Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a 
Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69, 175–76 (2015).
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misdemeanor arrests also draw people into systems of legal sanctions and 
control, often for low-level, nonviolent offenses or administrative codes.6 
Arrests require court appearances, even if a summons is issued in lieu of custody. 
Failure to appear in court or pay a fine can result in an arrest warrant. For those 
taken into custody, arrest requires posting bail for those not granted release 
on their own recognizance, or stays of varying length in pretrial detention for 
those unable to make bail.7 Summons for violations of administrative codes, 
vehicular violations, and other civil ordinances also are a staple of these police 
practices, resulting in fines or repetitive court appearances.8
An additional line of scholarship has looked more closely at how the tactics 
of the New Policing have become institutionalized in police-citizen interactions 
in the everyday lives of residents of poorer, predominantly minority, and higher-
crime areas of the nation’s cities. The internalization of harsh policing into 
everyday social interactions can produce cynicism toward law and legal actors, 
and a withdrawal of citizens from cooperation with the police to control crime.9
Residents of smaller areas face parallel issues. In these areas, despite generally 
lower crime rates, policing takes a different form: widespread pretextual traffic 
stops, extensive use of citations for vehicle defects,10 and citations for traffic 
violations (usually speeding) or administrative codes (high weeds on the 
property).11 This policing model can and often does result in fines, arrests and 
summonses requiring multiple court appearances. Few of these contacts result 
6. See Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanors,” in Volume 1 of the present Report [hereinafter 
Natapoff Chapter]; Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 611, 639, 668 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1358–
59 (2012).
7. See Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, “Pretrial Detention and Bail,” in Volume 3 of 
the present Report.
8. See Beth A. Colgan, “Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures,” in Volume 4 of the present Report; JACK 
MAPLE & CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD GUYS OUT OF BUSINESS 214 
(2000).
9. See David A. Harris, The Dangers of Racialized Perceptions and Thinking by Law 
Enforcement, in DEADLY INJUSTICE: TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 146, 155–56 (Devon Johnson et al. eds., 2015). See generally CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN 
MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE 
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal 
Cynicism, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017); Mark T. Berg et al., Cynical Streets: Neighborhood 
Social Processes and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 520 (2016); Matthew 
Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting 
in the Black Community, 81 AMER. SOC. REV. 857 (2016).
10. Such as broken taillights or expired registrations. For a discussion of pretextual stops and 
racial profiling, see David A. Harris, “Racial Profiling,” in the present Volume.
11. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4.
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in jail time, but many result in monetary costs for fees as well as fines and other 
financial sanctions.12 These financial burdens can metastasize from simple 
fines to warrants, from warrants to criminal arrests, and further to more severe 
penalties and a criminal conviction. In turn, exposure to criminal punishment 
imposes social and economic burdens with both near- and long-term impacts 
on employment, housing, and other social assets.
This chapter explores the design of these regimes and their impacts 
on citizens’ lives. In both cities and small places, policing has evolved from 
discretionary enforcement of civil and criminal codes to programmatic efforts 
to use legal sanctions that entangle citizens in an administrative regime with 
punitive consequences. These regimes of investigative stops, misdemeanor 
arrests and civil summonses are influenced by, and draw justifying ideology 
from, practices common to “Broken Windows” models of policing that are now 
common in cities across the United States.13 Broken Windows policing, with 
its focus on controlling social disorder, overlaps with proactive tactics such as 
stop-and-frisk, and the regimes of intensive use of misdemeanor arrests. In 
this design, the adjudication of guilt or innocence is replaced by a system that 
imposes social controls on the one hand, and a latent fiscal and social tax on 
the other.14 That these taxes fall most heavily on poor, non-White people is a 
significant feature of the New Policing.
Part I of the chapter provides case studies of New York and Ferguson, 
illustrating how the New Policing works in these two different contexts, 
especially the racial disenfranchisement that seems an inevitable outcome of 
these regimes. Part II discusses the consequences that citizens are assessed, 
including potential long-term consequences. Part III concludes the chapter 
with proposals for reform that can cabin these tactics and redirect police 
attention to more serious forms of crime.
12. See Colgan, supra note 8; Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal 
Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1186–1189. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: 
MONETARY SANCTIONS AS A PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 26–46 (2016); Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott 
Ash, New Policing, New Segregation, 106 GEO. L. J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2017).
13. BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 2, at 239; DICKEY, supra note 2, at 106; KELLING & COLES, 
supra note 2, at 188–91.
14. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 6.
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I. THE NEW POLICING
A. NEW YORK
In both popular and political culture, New York City epitomizes the New 
Policing. The city’s policing regime in fact sustained much of the policy and 
empirical literature on the nationwide crime decline throughout the second half 
of the 1990s and for years after. The theory of “Broken Windows” and policing 
disorder animated the New Policing,15 and was put into practice in the early 
1990s. The theory suggested that the appearance of social or physical disorder 
signaled vulnerability to would-be criminal offenders and in turn increased 
crime rates. The practical application of the theory was a broad-based program 
of investigative stops (stop-question-and-frisk, or SQF), misdemeanor arrests, 
and summons for non-criminal violations of administrative codes. Officers 
were deployed strategically based on crime mapping and metrics, and managers 
were closely monitored by police executives for their impacts on crime.
“Proactivity” in the form of Terry stops16 and “vigorous enforcement of laws 
against relatively minor [misdemeanor] offenses” 17 became core elements of 
the New Policing.18 Other research portrayed proactivity as a mixture of drug 
enforcement and community policing.19 Empirical research showed mixed 
support for the theory.20 Early research showed that aggressive enforcement of 
minor crimes—usually through arrest—deterred crime by signaling the risks 
15. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/ 304465/. 
16. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry permitted temporary stops and detentions 
based on reasonable suspicion that crime was “afoot,” supplanting the more demanding probable 
cause standard and memorializing police discretion as the gateway to street stops. Id. at 30.
17. Charis E. Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48 
CRIMINOLOGY 57, 57 (2010).
18. The original Broken Windows essay, whose ideas informed the New Policing and its 
proactive prong, argued that arrest should be a last resort when other efforts failed to ameliorate 
the disorderly conditions that invite crime. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 15. By 2000, Kelling 
had embraced the notion of using arrest authority systematically and aggressively to stop minor 
crime from growing into more serious crime patterns and problems. See KELLING & COLES, supra 
note 2, at 108–56.
19. See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior 
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 318 (2004).
20. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY 
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 73–75 (1992).
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of detection and punishment to criminal offenders.21 However, reanalyses of 
those data undermined Broken Windows’ claims.22 One study showed a sharp 
decline in gun violence in New York City in the early 1990s and gave partial 
credit to new police tactics, but emphasized the epidemic nature of the crime 
increase and decline.23 Other work credited aggressive policing in the form 
of drug-related misdemeanor arrests for the reduction in murder and other 
violence in New York City in the 1990s.24 Others found very small effects of 
misdemeanor arrests on crime,25 while some studies simply rejected the causal 
claims of New Policing advocates.26 Other research challenged the core notions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. See Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: 
EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 217, 238–39 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003); 
Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and 
Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 183–85 (1988). See generally Daniel S. Nagin, 
“Deterrence,” in Volume 4 of the present Report; Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the 21st Century: 
A Review of the Evidence, 42 CRIME & JUSTICE 199-263 (2013).
22. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York 
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 312–27 (1998).
23. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1297–98, 1313–16 (1998).
24. Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235, 
261–63 (2005).
25. See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Economic Conditions on 
Robbery and Property Crime: The Role of Consumer Sentiment, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 735, 750 (2007).
26. BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 
8–11 (2001); ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY 117–21 (2000); Judith A. Greene, Zero 
Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 
171, 177–78 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from 
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 317–20 (2006); Ana 
Joanes, Does the New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New York City’s 
Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 265, 303–304 (1999); Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Impact of Order-Maintenance 
Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988-2001, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 377 
(2007). But see ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 149; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME 
DECLINE 155–56 (2006). 
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of the disorder-crime relationship, showing that the connections between 
crime and disorder are uncertain.27  
B. RACE AND THE NEW POLICING IN NEW YORK
Race is one of two components of these policing regimes that expose its 
fault lines.28
In New York, proactivity resulted in very high rates of street stops, 
misdemeanor arrests, and court summonses, all of which potentially swept up 
neighborhood residents into legal controls, disproportionately to both racial 
composition and local crime rates, and with little to show for it.29 From 2004 to 
2014, police in New York recorded 4,811,769 stops.30 Stops were concentrated 
in police precincts and census tracts with high proportions of Black, Black 
Hispanic and White Hispanic population, after controlling for local crime 
rates.31 In other words, rather than allocating stops according to local crime 
rates, as theory would dictate, there were more officers per crime and more 
stops per crime in areas with higher concentrations of Black and Latino 
populations. Compounding the unequal distribution of policing, stops rarely 
 
 
27. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 26, at 309; RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM 
BROKEN WINDOWS 18 (2000) (finding no evidence that crime is related to disorder); Bernard E. 
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana 
Arrests In New York City, 1989-2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 165, 176 (2007); Robert J. 
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look 
at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637–38 (1999) (finding no direct link 
between disorder and crime). But see GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., DO POLICE 
MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 18 (2001) (finding 
evidence that crime is related to disorder); SKOGAN, supra note 20, at 10, Corman & Mocan, supra 
note 24, at 262; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 26, at 366–67. 
28. The other is the imposition of transactional costs both monetary and legal. I discuss that next.
29. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See Report of Jeffrey 
Fagan, Ph.D., at tbls. 5–9, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 
Civ. 01034 (SAS)); Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in an Age of Big Data, 20 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181-232 (2017); see also Fradella & White, supra note 5. 
30. Stop, Question and Frisk Database, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
31. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography 
and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309, 
309–10 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010). See also Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 560, 
587, 589, 661.
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resulted in arrests or seizures of contraband.32 The few stops that did result 
in arrests rarely involved serious crimes, and few resulted in convictions or 
punishment.33
Note: Bars represent average difference in rates of stop outcomes by race, relative to the average 
for Whites and other races. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by precinct. Regressions 
include controls for year, the suspected crime and the basis of suspicion for the stop. 
What takes place during the stop is another dimension of the New Policing. 
Aggressive stops were a hallmark of the New Policing, suggesting that stops not 
only were aimed at detecting contraband or perhaps those with outstanding 
warrants, but were a form of rough justice that signaled a deterrent component 
of police contact.34 Figure 1 and Appendix Table 1 show evidence of racial 
disparities in the use of frisks and force in interactions between officers and 
suspects. Relative to White suspects who have been stopped, all three non-
White groups were more likely to be frisked. For example, Blacks were frisked 
32. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 558–59; see also Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, 
Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 
10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365 (2016).
33. See ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING 
FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 8–9 app. G (2013).
34. See, e.g., Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban 
Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323–25 (2014); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz 
Z. Huq, American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice 
Alternative, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 343 (2011).
Reforming Criminal Justice
Note: Bars represent average difference in rates of stop outcomes by race, relative to the average for 
Whites and other races. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by precinct. Regressions include controls 
for year, the suspected crime and the basis of suspicion for the stop.  
What takes place during the stop is another dimension of the New Policing. Aggressive 
stops were a hallmark of the New Policing, suggesting that stops not only were aimed at 
detecting contraband or perhaps those with outstanding warrants, but were a form of rough 
justice tha  signaled a deterrent comp nent of poli contact.34 Figure 1 shows evidence of racial 
disparities in the use of frisks and force in interactions between officers and suspects. Relative to 
White suspects who have been stopped, all three non-White groups were more likely to be 
frisked. For example, Blacks were frisked 4.7% more often than Whites, White Hispanics 6.7% 
more often than Whit s, and Black Hispani s 7.2% more often than Whites. These differ nces all 
were statistically significant. But police also conduct many frisks where there was no indication 
of the presence of a weapon or violent behavior either in the suspected crime or in the suspicion 
bases of the stop. The second set of bars in Figure 1 describes these as unproductive frisks.
Again, police conducted these frisks significantly more likely for three non-White racial or 
ethnic groups compared to Whites.  
34 See, e.g., Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2321, 2323–25 (2014); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a 
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 
343 (2011). 
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Figure 1. Percent Differences in Stop Outcomes by Suspect Race, 
New York City, 2004-14
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4.7% more often than Whites, White Hispanics 6.7% more often than Whites, 
and Black Hispanics 7.2% more often than Whites. These differences all were 
statistically significant. But police also conduct many frisks where there was 
no indication of the presence of a weapon or violent behavior either in the 
suspected crime or in the suspicion bases of the stop. The second set of bars in 
Figure 1 describes these as unproductive frisks. Again, police conducted these 
frisks significantly more likely for three non-White racial or ethnic groups 
compared to Whites. 
Two additional sets of comparisons show differences by race in the use of 
force during a stop, and also for the “unnecessary” use of force: that is, force 
used in the absence of either weapons or violent behavior in the reason for 
the stop.35 Force was used 2.8% more often for Black suspects compared to 
Whites, 4.0% for White Hispanics, and 5.1% for Black Hispanics. Unnecessary 
force rates were consistently higher for non-White suspects compared to 
White suspects. These difference in both force and unnecessary force also were 
statistically significant. One implication of these analyses of the outcomes of 
frequent and racially skewed stops is that a resident of—or visitor to—minority 
neighborhoods under the New Policing moves about in their everyday social 
interactions knowing that they face nonconsensual police contact that is 
procedurally punitive even though there often is at best weak evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing.
35. See generally L. Song Richardson, “Police Use of Force,” in the present Volume.
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This duality for Black and other non-White suspects—arrests that lead to no charges or non-
serious charges, coupled with a greater risk of a criminal sanction and incarceration—seem to be 
present in tandem in this part of the New Policing. We observe much the same for Black 
Hispanic suspects, although their incarceration risks at the end of the process are not 
significantly greater than White suspects. The results are similar for White Hispanic suspects, 
with the exception of arrests conditional on stops. These events form a grinding process of 
accumulating arrest records that may increase in number over time to produce at some tipping 
point a spell of incarceration. The consequences are severe, though. Even if there is low risk of 
jail time, the effect of imposing a criminal conviction becomes indelible. A criminal conviction 
is a permanent mark, one that is not easily removed through sealing or expunging of records, and 
that can be a negative asset when seeking employment in the private sector or several types of 
housing.40
C. FERGUSON 
                                                                                                                                                            
probits estimated conditional on arraignment. Models for incarceration were order probit regressions based on 
probability of conviction. Robust standard errors in all models were clustered by police precinct. For a discussion of 
the impact of race on sentencing, see Cassia Spohn, “Race and Sentencing Disparity,” in Volume 4 of the present 
Report. 
40 Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 959–60 (2003); see also James Jacobs & 
Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
177, 207–10 (2008). 
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Figure 2. Odds Ratios of Sanction Rates by Suspect Race, 
New York City, 2004-12
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The fate of stops in these cases is another dimension to assess the impacts of 
the New Policing. Figure 2 and Appendix Table 2 show the odds ratio of racial 
disparities in the outcomes of street stops from 2009 to 2012 from the decision 
to arrest through sentencing for those cases that survive into court, comparing 
non-White to White suspects. An odds ratio of 0 indicates no difference, and a 
negative value indicates that the outcome is less likely for that group compared 
to Whites. In 12 of 15 analyses in Appendix Table 2 testing for disparate 
treatment by race or ethnicity, we observe significant effects that suggest 
harsher treatment of Black, Black Hispanic, and White Hispanic suspects.
Whether the stop resulted in an arrest, indicative of probable cause and 
a higher standard for the contact than the Terry standards of reasonable 
suspicion,36 is the first dimension of sanction outcomes. Figure 2 shows 
that relative to White suspects, all three groups of non-White suspects were 
more likely to be arrested if stopped but less likely to be arraigned if arrested. 
Details of the reasons for the attrition of nearly 18% of the arrests were not 
available. Generally, cases may drop out if quashed at the precinct by police 
supervisors, or if they were declined for prosecution due to legal insufficiency 
or other evidentiary concerns.37 The lower arraignment rate suggests the legal 
insufficiency of these arrests. The fact of an arrest that is dropped transforms the 
arrest process into a form of front-end punishment for non-White suspects, yet 
another expression of the managerialism38 that characterizes the New Policing. 
36. Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 111–13. 
37. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1655–56, 1656 n.1 (2010). Bowers suggests that prosecutors 
inherently have the power not to charge and do so for three possible reasons: legal reasons (such 
as insufficient evidence); administrative reasons (such as prioritizing case assignments, inability 
to produce complaining witnesses); and equitable reasons (such as moral-judgment-based 
assessments of the seriousness of the crime, the culpability of the suspect, or the character of 
actors). Id. at 1656–57.
38. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 6, at 648–49
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Once arraigned, non-White suspects are 27.7% to 38.6% more likely to be 
convicted, but for less serious crimes. Appendix Table 2 shows that if convicted, 
non-White suspects are 45.3% to 87.8% more likely to be convicted of a less 
serious charge with a lower sentencing tariff. But, Figure 2 shows that even with 
lower convictions charges, Black defendants relative to Whites are more likely 
(31.2%) to serve time in jail or be sentenced to prison.39
This duality for Black and other non-White suspects—arrests that lead to 
no charges or non-serious charges, coupled with a greater risk of a criminal 
sanction and incarceration—seem to be present in tandem in this part of the 
New Policing. We observe much the same for Black Hispanic suspects, although 
their incarceration risks at the end of the process are not significantly greater 
than White suspects. The results are similar for White Hispanic suspects, with 
the exception of arrests conditional on stops. These events form a grinding 
process of accumulating arrest records that may increase in number over time 
to produce at some tipping point a spell of incarceration. The consequences 
are severe, though. Even if there is low risk of jail time, the effect of imposing 
a criminal conviction becomes nearly indelible. A criminal conviction is a 
permanent mark, one that is not easily removed through sealing or expunging 
of records, and that can be a negative asset when seeking employment in the 
private sector or several types of housing.40
C. FERGUSON
Long before the protests erupted in Ferguson over the shooting of unarmed 
Black teenager Michael Brown by White officer Darren Wilson, the Ferguson 
Police Department (FPD) practiced its own version of New Policing.41 But 
unlike the high-crime urban laboratories of the New Policing, Ferguson was not 
plagued by high rates of violent crime; in fact, violent crime rates were declining 
39. Results show odds ratio is compared to White suspects. N=2,396,314 stops. The total 
arrests recorded were 148,880; 7,500 cases were eliminated because of duplicate or incomplete 
arrest identifiers. In addition, 146,323 cases resulted in issuance of a summons. Logistic 
regressions for arrest and arraignment were estimated with controls for suspect age and 
gender, and controls effects for year and arrest charge. Models for arraignment were estimated 
conditional on probability of any sanction (arrest or summons). Models for conviction (plea) 
were ordered probits estimated conditional on arraignment. Models for incarceration were 
order probit regressions based on probability of conviction. Robust standard errors in all models 
were clustered by police precinct. For a discussion of the impact of race on sentencing, see Cassia 
Spohn, “Race and Sentencing Disparity,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
40. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 959–60 (2003); see also 
James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 
11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 207–10 (2008).
41. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4, at 3–5.
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in Ferguson for several years preceding the Michael Brown shooting and the 
protests.42 Instead, small towns like Ferguson turned to a model based on the 
saturation of misdemeanor enforcement, traffic and other vehicular codes, and 
enforcement of civil codes. In this way, the policing model in Ferguson reflected 
a variation of New Policing that closely resembles the type of managerial justice 
that characterized misdemeanor enforcement in urban areas. The reliance on 
code enforcement, traffic enforcement, and misdemeanor arrests suggests a 
thread connecting the order-maintenance prong of New Policing in cities with 
New Policing in less urban locales such as Ferguson.
What made Ferguson unique was the profit motive that had been injected into 
the policing regime.43 The policing regime was designed to extract revenue not 
only from Ferguson residents, but also from people passing through Ferguson 
from nearby municipalities. The proximity of Ferguson to its surrounding areas 
created a spatial concentration that broadened the reach of FPD policing to 
non-residents.44 FPD enforcement was tailored to this revenue-generating goal. 
The offenses cited by FPD officers in traffic stops and other citizen contacts 
generated a volume of fees and fines that were integrated into the municipal 
budget.45 When persons failed to pay these financial penalties, further fees 
and interest followed, compounding debt. These non-criminal court actions 
often grew into criminal matters when failures to pay led to criminal warrants. 
Once arrested for the outstanding warrants, the compounding of LFOs 
described earlier sank these individuals, already poor, deeper into poverty.46 
The racial component of these policing dynamics compounded the historical 
racial inequalities in Ferguson.47
D. RACE AND POLICING IN FERGUSON
The Ferguson Report not only documented extraordinary racial disparities in 
both traffic enforcement but also in enforcement of civil codes.48 Several measures 
of discretionary police behavior more closely show the role of race in traffic 
enforcement. The implications of stops, tickets, arrests, and seizures are evident 
not only in the generation of revenue, but also in the creation of criminal liability.
42. Id. at 7 n.7 (indicating that the records of the FPD and the FBI “show[ed] a downward 
trend in serious crime” from 2004–2014).
43. Id. at 2; see also Developments in the Law: Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 
1734–35 (2015). 
44. Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, fig.2.
45. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id. at 76–78.
48. Id. at 7.
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The regression results in Figure 3 and Appendix Table 3 tested for racial 
differences in police decisions during these stops.49 The results are conditioned 
at predicate stages of each case: whether contraband is seized depends on 
whether the driver or vehicle is searched, and whether a warrant arrest is the 
reason for the arrest compared to other reasons. These regressions, like those 
in previous tables, provide controls for several non-race factors—in particular 
the stated reason for the stop—that may be correlated both with race and 
policing choices.
Controlling for the reason for the stop, the first column in Figure 3 shows 
that Black drivers were 35% more likely than Whites to be ticketed pursuant to a 
stop. The second column shows that Blacks are 93% more likely, or nearly twice 
as likely, to be arrested.50 These statistically significant results suggest that these 
patterns are unlikely to occur by chance alone. The search results in the third 
column show that Blacks are 67% more likely than Whites to have their vehicle 
searched once stopped, again a statistically significant effect. But the fourth 
column shows that seizures of contraband are less likely for vehicles operated 
by Blacks, conditional on being searched. In this case, the 26% lower odds of a 
“hit” (seizure) for Blacks (not statistically significant) suggests that stops and 
searches are a form of preference-based rather than statistical discrimination.51 
Why bother to continue stopping and searching Black motorists if there is 
no greater likelihood that those searches will pay off, other than a preference to 
stop Blacks? This is the essence of preference-based discrimination under the 
New Policing. Statistical discrimination would reflect a tendency to stop one 
group at a higher rate than another group based on observable characteristics 
such as known crime rates. But preference-based discrimination would reflect 
a tendency to prefer one group for stops over others based on factors unrelated 
to observable differences in the targeted behavior, such as race. Preference-
based discrimination suggests that the purpose of stops is to select a particular 
group for criminal justice attention, independent of the likelihood of a positive 
result. If police in Ferguson are stopping Blacks more often without finding 
49. Table 3 compares the probability of each of several outcomes of a police encounter by 
race as a percentage of the number of stops, and then comparing the rates by race to those of 
Whites. See Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl.4 & fig.3. 
50. It is possible that drivers exhibit unreported behaviors that might lead to a decision to 
sanction them. If there are such differences in suspect behavior leading to tickets or arrests, those 
behaviors are not described by the officers in official reports.
51. Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn 
from Police Search Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368, F379 (2006); see also Kate Antonovics & Brian G. 
Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 163 (2009).
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more drugs or weapons, it suggests that these are punitive searches, further 
evidence of disparate racial treatment before the law.
Column 5 in Figure 3 shows that for Black defendants, an arrest warrant is 
more than twice as likely to result from a traffic stop or other citation compared 
to White defendants. Enforcement in Ferguson produced an astonishing 
volume of warrants: the municipal court in Ferguson issued 32,975 warrants 
in 2013,52 more than one per resident and most likely, more than one for every 
motorist passing through Ferguson,53 and nearly all for nonviolent offenses.54 
Recall that the median per capita income in Ferguson in 2013 was $40,660, 
and that nearly one in four persons lived below the poverty line.55 That this is 
racially skewed suggests again a racial tax against those who can least afford it.
This pattern is consistent with the emphasis that FPD officers and municipal 
executives place on enforcement of warrants, and the motivating role of 
outstanding warrants in determining the outcomes of stops. Warrant arrests 
lead to criminal punishment, in turn leading to LFOs that add monetary 
52. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 302–
03, http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=68905.
53. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
54. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, supra note 52, at 173–94.
55. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/
pages/index.xhtml (search Community Facts field for “Ferguson, MO”; then select “Show All”).
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for the stop—that may be correlated both with race and policing choices. 
Controlling for the reason for the stop, the first column in Figure 3 shows that Black drivers 
were 35% more likely than Whites to be ticketed pursuant to a stop. The second column shows 
that Blacks are 93% more likely, or nearly twice as likely, to be arrested.50 These statistically 
significant results suggest that these patterns are unlikely to occur by chance alone. The search 
results in the third column show that Blacks are 67% more likely than Whites to have their 
vehicle searched once stopped, again a statistically significant effect. But the fourth column 
shows that seizures of contraband are less likely for vehicles operated by Blacks, conditional on 
being searched. In this case, the 26% lower odds of a “hit” (seizure) for Blacks (not statistically 
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Why bother to continue stopping and searching Black motorists if there is no greater 
likelihood that those searches will pay off, other than a preference to stop Blacks? This is the 
essence of preference-based discrimination under the New Policing. Statistical discrimination 
would reflect a tendency to stop one group at a higher rate than another group based on 
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reflect a tenden y to prefer one group for stops ov r others based on factors unrelated to 
50 It is possible that drivers exhibit unreported behaviors that might lead to a decision to sanction them. If there are 
such differences in suspect behavior leading to tickets or arrests, those behaviors are not described by the officers in 
official reports. 
51 Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn from Police Search 
Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368, F379 (2006); see also Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial 
Profiling: Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163 (2009). 
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costs to the liberty costs of warrant arrests. Here, if the goal of policing is to 
detect persons with outstanding warrants and continue the economic drain 
on those defendants, then the police are in fact maximizing on that goal—a 
form of statistical discrimination. But it is the predicate processes of stops, 
citations, and searches that lead to the issuance of a warrant that is infected 
with race-based and preferential discrimination. In other words, if police are 
stopping Black motorists with the hope of getting a warrant arrest, the ocean 
of outstanding warrants among Black drivers makes this a good bet by the FPD.
Once these cases get to court, the pattern of racially disparate policing 
continues. An important mechanism for the proliferation of warrants and 
subsequent warrant arrests is the operation of the municipal court system in 
Ferguson, and elsewhere in the northeastern corner of St. Louis County.56 The 
processes described in Figure 3 and Appendix Table 3 result in a racially skewed 
population in the Municipal Court, where most of these cases are resolved. 
Although Blacks are 67% of the Ferguson population, they are 74% of Municipal 
Court defendants. Within that court population, they are 81% of the population 
receiving summonses, 91% of those with warrants issued for their arrest, and 
95% of the persons arrested.57 Black defendants in the Municipal Court average 
3.5 citations per appearance, about 50% more than the rate of 2.3 summonses 
per White defendants. Black defendants average 4.7 warrants per defendant, 
compared to 1.4 warrants per White defendant. They have 2.25 arrests each 
(relative to just 0.3 for Whites). Finally, as shown earlier, Blacks have more 
warrants and arrests when controlling for the number of summonses.
Figure 4 summarizes a series of regressions showing outcomes of cases by 
race once they enter the Municipal Court.58 The figure reports the average 
percent difference in each outcome between Black and White defendants, 
providing simple measures of racial disparities in misdemeanor justice. By 
using percentages, the results are comparable on the same scale.
56. See THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCH CITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER 27–37 
(2014), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=98433.
57. Fagan & Ash, supra note 12.
58. The full results are shown in Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl. 6. The regressions include 
several covariates that measure non-race factors, both legal and demographic. We also include 
fixed effects for the range of offenses that bring people into the Municipal Court and that one 
would expect to affect penalties and other outcomes. The standard errors in the regressions are 
clustered by the defendant’s resident zip code, to adjust the significance estimates for local crime 
and social conditions.
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Figure 4. Effect Sizes of Black-White Differences  
in Case Outcomes, Ferguson (Mean, 95% CI)
Race has a substantial impact on each outcome after controlling for 
potential non-racial influences on court outcomes. The results in the first 
row can be translated into dollar amounts. For bail bond size, Figure 4 shows 
that conditional on the same offense, bail bond amounts imposed on Black 
defendants are more than $400 higher, creating barriers for those defendants 
to make bail. As noted earlier, a spell of pretrial detention adversely affects 
the disposition and sentence in criminal cases, and creates personal hardships 
for defendants with work or school commitments or child-care duties. These 
hardships are skewed heavily toward Blacks. Once adjudicated, usually via plea 
agreement, Blacks are 2.5% more likely to have a fine imposed than Whites for 
the same offense. In contrast, Black defendants are 5.8% less likely to have their 
cases dismissed than White defendants, suggesting more formal adjudication 
and the likelihood of an LFO or a criminal record, or both. 
Conditional on receiving a fine, the fine for the same offense is 4% larger 
on average for Blacks. These stricter penalties are further reflected in worse 
outcomes following the fine levy. Blacks are 2% more likely to have a positive 
financial obligation at the end of the case, meaning they have been unable—
compared to Whites—to pay the full fine amount by the time the court case 
nears its conclusion. Conditional on having any balance at all, that balance 
is 22% larger. These impacts are statistically significant. And remember once 
again that the Ferguson population is often poor and otherwise earns a 
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between Black and White defendants, providing simple measures of racial disparities in 
misdemeanor justice. By using percentages, the results are comparable on the same scale. 
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These impacts are statistically significant. And remember once again that the Ferguson 
population is often poor and otherwise earns a median household income of barely more than 
$40,000.59 Finally, Blacks are significantly more likely to have a warrant issued and more likely 
to be arrested. Strikingly, Blacks are 15% more likely to have a warrant issued than Whites. This 
                                                                                                                                                            
measure non-race factors, both legal and demographic. We also include fixed effects for the range of offenses that 
bring people into the Municipal Court and that one would expect to affect penalties and other outcomes. The 
standard errors in the regressions are clustered by the defendant’s resident zip code, to adjust the significance 
estimates for local crime and social conditions. 
59 Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl. 1. 
98
median household income of barely more than $40,000.59 Finally, Blacks are 
significantly more likely to have a warrant issued and more likely to be arrested. 
Strikingly, Blacks are 15% more likely to have a warrant issued than Whites. 
This may reflect the stricter monetary penalties resulting in more delinquency, 
or it may again reflect an independent source of racially based treatment.
II. THE NEW POLICING AS A LATENT RACIAL TAX
The New Policing exacts two types of latent taxes on persons who are 
brought into the criminal justice system, whether by stops and arrests, as in 
New York, or through a program of saturated traffic enforcement in Ferguson. 
One regime starts with the imposition of monetary taxes that morph into 
criminal liability, while the other starts with panvasive and intrusive street 
stops that sweep suspects into the police gaze and for some, into the courts and 
jails.60 Each has a monetary component and each can end with a stigmatizing 
criminal conviction. 
Monetary penalties have proven to be quite popular in state legislatures and 
in criminal legal institutions.61 Fines are seen both as a legitimate deterrent 
to wrongdoing and a means of transferring the costs of criminal justice 
administration (courts, police, prisons, etc.) to the prisoner, costs that would 
otherwise fall on ostensibly law-abiding taxpayers. Further, administrative fees 
allow state and local legislators to get around tough rules limiting local tax 
increases. Fines and administrative fees therefore provide a path to budgetary 
relief with limited legislative or court oversight. Much of this is administrative, 
not statutory, rule-making, a tax that is not called a tax. 
But the impetus for this form of taxation runs deeper into the culture 
of criminal justice. Professor Alexes Harris shows that it is not simply fiscal 
interests in recuperating costs from poor defendants that seemed to animate 
the institutional postures; rather, Professor Harris shows how these fines are 
shaped by perceptions of criminal defendants—regardless of crime severity—
59. Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl. 1.
60. See Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L. J. 1721, 1723 (2014) (characterizing “panvasive” surveillance 
as large scale police mobilization to surveil and contact citizens without reasonable suspicion, 
most of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing). 
61. Policing and Profit, supra note 43.
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as deserving of this extra burden beyond formal punishments.62 In effect, this 
view of defendants reflects a justifying ideology about the undeserving offender 
that links money to crime and punishment.63 
A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TAXES
The expansion of misdemeanor justice, driven in part by the New Policing, 
commonly imposes non-trivial fines and fees at each stage of the process, from 
arrest to efforts to expunge criminal records.64 Ferguson illustrates this newly 
expanded system of fee-based criminal justice that taxes defendants. Disparate 
racial treatment at each stage of processing in Ferguson skews the tax toward 
minorities, whose economic position often is more tenuous than that of their 
White counterparts. Traffic stops lead to tickets and fines, and the inability to 
pay those fines can lead to criminal arrests. Once arrested, the inability to post 
bail raises issues both before and after adjudication. Defendants charged with 
minor misdemeanors or outstanding warrants may have difficulty retaining 
counsel if required to pay a fee to establish indigency, or the assignment of 
counsel may be delayed during the scramble to post bond in the interim 
between arrest and first appearance.65 
The risk of fee default at that stage leading to pretrial delay or—worse—
pretrial detention in turn leads to the risk of an adverse court outcome in terms 
of charging and sentencing. Empirical studies confirm that defendants who are 
detained pretrial are more likely to be convicted by plea or trial, and also receive 
62. HARRIS, supra note 12, at 14–15; see also Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the 
Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982). Having 
offenders pay for pre-adjudication costs, including filing fees, and vetting their eligibility for 
indigent defense, presumes that they are in fact guilty of a criminal offense or a civil violation. 
Given the high rates of plea bargaining in the lower criminal courts in misdemeanor cases, as 
well as the high rates of prosecutorial declination and court dismissal, this is an assumption 
fraught with risk and potentially error.
63. See, e.g., John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-
Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 260 (2005).
64. Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1185; see also HARRIS, supra note 12, at 18, 42. Although 
there are monetary burdens associated with felony case processing, such as taxing offenders to 
pay for probation or drug treatment or electronic monitoring in lieu of jail, these measures affect 
a smaller population facing prison. 
65. See generally Eve Brensike Primus, “Defense Counsel and Public Defense,” in Volume 3 of 
the present Report.
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harsher sentences.66 Failure to pay the latent taxes of fees, in effect, prejudices 
court outcomes and all the burdens that come with either a monetary fine or 
a criminal conviction. In effect, these regimes require defendants—assuming 
they can afford them—to pay fees and costs for the very court processes 
that lead to their punishment.67 It seems that the municipality of Ferguson 
was cloaking its taxing power in the exercise of police power by functionally 
equating the power of taxation with the power to punish.
Criminal justice taxation in New York had features similar to Ferguson, but 
also distinct to the managerialism that characterized the New Policing there. In 
this setting, transactional costs exact a different tax on defendants, but a tax that 
still can lead to criminal conviction and associated stigma and burdens. Black 
and Latino suspects face stops with no arrests, and often, arrests with either no 
charges or trivial charges. Still, these cases require repeated court appearances 
over several months before they reach a conclusion. Monetary costs follow, 
whether in the form of processing fees for cases or for lost time and wages from 
the disruption of repeat court appearances.
If convicted, usually for the least serious grades of misdemeanors, the 
stigma of a criminal conviction attaches, creating social and economic burdens 
and deficits.68 At the same time, for the few cases that proceed to court, most 
plead out after long delays and multiple court appearances, coupled with a 
greater risk of a criminal sanction and incarceration. Overall, summonses are 
as often dismissed as they are sustained, if not more often, but are more likely 
to be dismissed when issued in neighborhoods with higher proportions of 
Black residents.69 Those that are sustained often result in monetary costs, an 
example of the burdens of legal financial obligations.70 But whether dismissed 
or sustained, there are costs (beyond the fine) attached to court appearances 
66. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (showing evidence detained defendants 
are 25% more likely than similarly situated releasees to plead guilty, 43% more likely to be 
sentenced to jail, and receive jail sentences that are more than twice the average sentence); see 
also Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 
1, 18 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2777615 (showing that that pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase in the likelihood of 
being convicted compared to similarly situated persons who were released before adjudication). 
See generally Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 7.
67. Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1190–92. See Fagan & Ash, supra note 12.
68. See, e.g., Natapoff Chapter, supra note 6.
69 Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl.10.
70. For an example of the burdens of pretrial bail, see Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & 
Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 45 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 471, 472 (2016).
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simply to answer the summons. If these processing fees—taxes, in effect—are 
skewed racially by selective enforcement targeting Black or Latino persons—
or neighborhoods with high concentrations of Black and Latino residents—
the Sixth Amendment concerns multiply, raising both due process and equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.71 Costs to the defendant, 
usually Black or Latino, are exacted through court appearances. 
Because these pre-adjudication processing fees are not technically 
punishment, their status exempts them from constitutional scrutiny under the 
Eighth Amendment. They may, however, interfere with a defendant’s rights 
under the Sixth Amendment.72 For example, poor defendants may be unable to 
pay for filing fees to determine their eligibility for indigent defense. Exercising 
the right to obtain a lawyer at the state’s expense cannot constitutionally be 
conditioned on ability to pay.73 In arguing their case, poor defendants may 
be unable to pay fees to obtain documents such as medical, employment, or 
housing records. The cost of this tax is a disadvantage at adjudication and a 
greater risk of conviction and its associated burdens.
B. A POVERTY TAX
The onset of New Policing reached deeply into the lives and the pockets of 
mostly poor and predominantly minority citizens,74 potentially deepening any 
pre-existing impoverishment75 while aggravating racial disparities in criminal 
justice.76 The expansion of misdemeanor justice collided with the new forms 
of taxation on criminal offenders to multiply the reach of New Policing to 
penetrate minority communities significantly more often and more intensively 
than in predominantly White communities. For example, an analysis of 27 
independent datasets showed that non-Whites were nearly one-third more 
likely (26% as compared to 20%) than Whites to be arrested.77 Other empirical 
71. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 12.
72. Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1224.
73. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963).
74. HARRIS, supra note 12, at 11–12; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1177.
75. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
6–10 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf.
76. HARRIS, supra note 12, at 14–15, 156; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1177.
77. Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect Race 
on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 490–91 (2011).
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studies confirm racial or community influences on the decision to arrest.78 
Stops and arrests also spill over to bias in the form of exclusions from serving on 
juries,79 or college enrollment, attendance and achievement.80 In other words, 
stops and arrests will beget stops and arrests and “spillover discrimination,” 
simply by stigmatizing a neighborhood or smaller area as a “high-crime area.” 
A connecting thread between large and small cities is the expanding net 
of legal, social, and economic consequences of misdemeanor arrests and 
convictions: a criminal record; an immigration hold and detention leading 
perhaps to deportation; eviction from public housing or failure to meet rent 
obligations; suspension of driving privileges; disruptions in employment or 
schooling; and child-custody disruption.81 For those unable to post bond, a 
pretrial spell in jail can bias later proceedings toward harsher dispositions and 
sentences.82 Failure to be present at any of a sequence of court dates can lead 
to a warrant and criminal arrest. In the wider community, harsh enforcement 
of minor disorder violations takes a psychological toll. Persistent “crackdowns” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78. See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008); Karen F. Parker, Brian J. Stults & Stephen K. Rice, Racial 
Threat, Concentrated Disadvantage and Social Control: Considering the Macro-Level Sources of 
Variation in Arrests, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 1111 (2005); Douglas A. Smith, Christy A. Visher & Laura 
A. Davidson, Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1984). 
79. Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates 
Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 412-14 (2016) (showing how prosecutors use prior arrests 
of prospective jurors as race-neutral explanations to justify peremptory strikes of Blacks during 
voire dire).
80. Alex O. Widdowson, Sonja E. Siennick & Carther Hay, The Implications of Arrest for 
College Enrollment: An Analysis of Long-Term Effects and Mediating Mechanisms, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 
621, 624–26 (2016) (showing that arrested youth were 9% less likely than non-arrested youth to 
enroll in a four-year college within a decade after high school graduation).
81. See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 300–06 (2009); see also Eisha 
Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–44 (2015) (discussing the consequences of 
arrests); Gabriel J. Chin, “Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction,” in Volume 4 of the 
present Report.
82. Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect Effects and 
Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 KAN. L. REV. 879, 880, 895 (2008); Marian R. Williams, The Effect of 
Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 299, 313 (2003).
Race and the New Policing 103
on the day-to-day activities of neighborhood residents in public spaces insert 
police into the developmental landscape of children living in those areas, 
leading to tensions and cynicism between citizens and police, even among 
neighborhood children.83
In cities, as in suburbs and exurbs, movements of citizens are affected by police 
tactics. When police routinely intervene in the everyday lives of citizens, they 
impose social interaction costs that inevitably deter residents from moving freely. 
And when these police actions produce legal and economic consequences for those 
already in disadvantaged social positions, those consequences effectively lock 
them in already disadvantaged places by constraining choices of neighborhood 
selection.84 Even when a neighborhood changes for the better, it retains its status 
relative to other neighborhoods that are changing simultaneously.85 Since police 
deployments and actions are racialized and focused in poor and segregated 
places, police in effect reproduce inequality, racial stratification and segregation 
through criminal legal enforcement actions that can constrain mobility.
Linking policing to the reinforcement of racial boundaries is not new; 
indeed, defense of property has been cited often in explaining police actions.86 
One consequence of the New Policing, then, is to reinforce racial residential 
segregation by deterring movement and burdening non-Whites with criminal 
cases. This in turn leads to additional types of taxation. First, the blocking 
effects of segregation on mobility serve to consign those living in segregated 
neighborhoods to long-term exposure to a set of social and psychological 
toxins that reinforce the individual and collective disadvantages of these 
83. Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC. 
JUST. RES. 217, 229–31 (2005); see also PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 
AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 150, 157 (2013) (showing that the presence of 
police is part of a spectrum of persistent disadvantages facing residents in Black poor minority 
neighborhoods).
84. Robert J. Sampson & Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Selection and the Social Reproduction 
of Concentrated Inequality, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 20–21 tbl.4 (2008) (showing the intergenerational 
reproduction of racial inequality through constrained mobility pathways that vary by race and 
ethnicity).
85. Robert J. Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, Social 
Processes, and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, in POVERTY TRAPS 176, 199 
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2006).
86. Raising the costs for Black residents or visitors to move freely through either mixed or 
predominantly White social spaces would ward off encroachments that might diminish property 
value, or protect against property loss. Those motives, together with personal safety fears, 
were drivers of the move toward segregation in early twentieth century St. Louis. See RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/2N27-CTHB.
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poverty traps.87 Perhaps most important is subsequent exposure to crime and 
victimization. Across studies, there is a robust and persistent link between 
racial residential segregation and neighborhood rates of violent crime. 88
Second, racial segregation and inequality impacts the economic lives of 
Black persons in their access to capital and their ability to multiply it. Limited 
access to capital reduces the ability of Black and other minority business 
borrowers to invest and multiply their capital. One study of borrowing for 
home mortgages showed that Black borrowers are 30% more likely to have 
their business-loan applications rejected compared to White borrowers, after 
controlling for a rich set of alternative factors including the borrower, the firm 
and the characteristics of the lender.89
If the New Policing is reinforcing and deepening segregation, these empirical 
studies suggest that it also is contributing to health disparities, higher risks 
of mortality and crime victimization, and attenuated access to educational 
and employment and economic opportunities, effects that are produced by 
segregation.90 These deficits compound the direct economic burdens imposed 
by New Policing and the regimes of legal financial obligations that can deepen 
segregation. Together with poor housing conditions and limited access to basic 
neighborhood amenities, segregation appears to have a churning effect on the 
processes and structures that contribute to sustained economic disadvantage, 
or the perpetuation of poverty traps through downward socioeconomic 
mobility.91 In other words, New Policing contributes to being “stuck in place,” 
or the cross-generational legacy of urban disadvantage.92
87. Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 85, at 199 (“[N]eighborhoods remain remarkably stable 
in their relative economic standing ... which means that the overall pattern of neighborhood 
inequality did not change much over time [and that] further change is invariably in the direction 
of greater racial homogeneity and more poverty.”).
88. John R. Logan & Steven F. Messner, Racial Residential Segregation and Suburban Violent 
Crime, 68 SOC. SCI. Q. 510, 510 (1987) (arguing for the consideration of “racial residential 
segregation as an independent variable with important consequences for metropolitan 
communities”); Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Racial Segregation and Black Urban 
Homicide, 71 SOC. FORCES 1001, 1001, 1006 (1993) (showing evidence from 125 central cities that 
“social isolation ... is the mechanism by which segregation leads to higher levels of homicide 
among African Americans.”).
89. Darius Palia, Differential Access to Capital from Financial Institutions by Minority 
Entrepreneurs, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 756, 777–78 (2016).
90. For a detailed review, see Fagan & Ash, supra note 12.
91. SHARKEY, supra note 83, at 114–15.
92. Id. at 117.
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III. A REFORM AGENDA
The balance of costs and benefits from the New Policing suggests the 
necessity for rethinking of these regimes. A program of reform can be 
designed to link institutional and statutory design to the strengths of these 
models but more important to mitigate their adverse effects. Some of the 
proposed reforms suggest a regulatory design, whether through internal audits 
and collaboration from within, or by regulation through political oversight. 
Some may lead to other democratic processes with multiple stakeholders. In 
extreme cases, reform may come through the last resort of litigation. Some 
of the proposed reforms require activating available oversight mechanisms, 
while other reforms suggest the creation either of new entities or methods to 
integrate the missions and activities of existing ones. Some reforms will require 
statute, others administrative regulation. Some will require the involvement of 
professional oversight groups. Most will be cost-free, although for cities like 
Ferguson, there are important measures to limit revenue derived from fines 
and fees, requiring some hard choices in municipal budgets. These tradeoffs 
are necessary to mitigate harms.
A. CAP REVENUE FROM TRAFFIC AND NON-TRAFFIC FINES
Missouri passed SB 5 in 2015, legislation that mitigated harms to motorists 
in two ways. The first was aimed at persons who received tickets or summons. 
The bill limits fines imposed when combined with court costs to $300 for minor 
traffic violations.93 The bill also creates a provision for taxpayers to request an 
income-tax offset for the amounts of unpaid court costs, fines, fees and other 
amounts ordered by a municipality in excess of $25.94 These provisions are 
aimed at minimizing the criminal justice “tax” on persons resulting from the 
excesses of the New Policing. A second provision of the bill, called Mack’s Creek 
Law, lowers the cap on municipal revenue from traffic fines from 30% to 20%, 
effective in 2016, and lowering the cap in St. Louis County to 12.5%.95 
The downside of these measures is a potential shift in taxpayer burden 
to homeowners and business owners, to make up the shortfall and ensure 
continuity in police services. To avoid that shift in tax burden, a new bill, SB 
572, was introduced and approved in 2016 that applies the same limits to fees 
and fines imposed for non-traffic violations96 in Missouri SB 5. These measures 
reduce the incentives for local government through its police to pursue the 
93. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.353.
94. Id. § 479.356.
95. Id. § 479.359 (repealing § 302.341).
96. Such as high weeds or peeling house paint.
Reforming Criminal Justice106
revenue-generating “taxation” prong of the New Policing, and are a model 
for other jurisdictions that may abuse their discretionary policing authority 
to create revenue streams that benefit the municipality as well as the police 
officers and courts imposing those fines.
B. ADJUDICATION OF GUILT AND SENTENCING
Managerialism in the criminal courts diminishes incentives for adjudicating 
guilt or innocence and replaces those incentives with calendar management 
and expedited court resolution.97 Court reforms that strengthen the ability of 
defendants to defend against the charges and reduce the reliance on pleas are 
important to reduce the criminal justice and poverty taxes imposed by the New 
Policing on those arrested. Several measures are needed to realize this goal.
1. Strengthen indigent defense to avoid reliance on pleas to close cases.
2. Develop race-neutral, risk-based instruments to determine pretrial 
release eligibility and, failing to secure release, to determine bail amounts.
3. Take speedy trial rules seriously.98
4. Limit the number of non-appearances by police to two before dismissal 
of charges.
5. Cap bail amounts within defendant means to pay.
6. Introduce means tests for fines to avoid default and subsequent 
criminal arrest warrants.
7. Provide assistance for expungement of arrest records.
8. Provide advisory counsel for persons responding to summons for 
ordinance and civil violations.
These measures are structural reforms that require policy levers more than 
statutory change, as well as court rules that judges can impose in the interest of 
justice for indigent defendants facing fines or jail. Their goal is to reduce reliance 
97. Stephen Bright & Sia Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance after Gideon v. 
Wainright, 122 YALE L.J. 100, 102 (2013) (critiquing the current state of courts as “plea mills: 
courts of profit that impose fines without any inquiry into the ability of defendants to pay, thus 
setting them up for failure and return to jail”); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 6, at 643 
(citing the flood of dismissals and heavily discounted sentences issued by judges “simply to 
secure quick and easy pleas”).
98. William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y. TIMES (April 
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-misdemeanor-
cases-trials-are-elusive.html?smid=tw-share (citing the abuse by prosecutors of “increasingly 
elastic speedy-trial rules of the Bronx were finally stretched too far by delay after delay, prosecutors 
would sometimes drop the cases as if they were never quite worth their time anyway”).
Race and the New Policing 107
on pleas and the piling up of the secondary costs of a criminal conviction, costs 
that can create impediments to social and economic stability and mobility. In 
the case of summons, advisory counsel can assist respondents who may seek 
to challenge the validity of a summons, or who can advise respondents of their 
procedural rights with respect to payment.
C. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
A number of mechanisms to mass data can be implemented to create 
internal mechanisms to audit and regulate police activity. It is ironic that the 
emphasis on metrics in the New Policing has not been redirected to measure 
the performance and impacts of these policies on the lives of the policed. A few 
common-sense steps, borrowing from education and medicine, can shed light 
on the production of criminal convictions for the least serious crimes.
1. Require audits and reporting by state attorneys general.99 
2. Ensure transparency and public access to data on the progression and 
outcomes of cases, with details on the benchmarks.
3. Mandate a duty of responsible administration of policing as a matter 
of due process, with remedies for violations.100
D. LITIGATION
Development of state-level statutes providing the remedies and relief 
available under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, including civil-rights actions by states when 
police are found to have engaged in a pattern and practice of violations.101
Litigation—whether through § 14141 or instead through claims brought 
by individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—is a last resort when democratic and 
political oversight fails to remedy recurring civil-rights violations. But the 
shifting political landscape in the U.S. Department of Justice suggests that 
federal civil-rights litigation may by necessity give way to state actions.102 
State actions have the advantage of leveraging the legitimacy of state elected 
99. The new legislation in Missouri has strong reporting requirements that mandate 
accounting by municipalities of their police activity and linkages to their revenue streams.
100. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the 
Problem of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 165 (2016).
101. See Samuel Walker & Morgan MacDonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: 
A Model State “Pattern and Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 479 (2009) (arguing 
for a state law closely modeled from 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to effect change in local policing when 
police create a pattern of violations of state constitutional rights). 
102. Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Troubled Police 
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff-
sessions-crime.html?smid=tw-share. 
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officials in bringing about reforms to policing under state constitutional law. 
Some state attorneys general have used state power in federal court under a 
parens patriae doctrine to bring about police institutional reform.103 There 
also are new models of local democratic oversight of police, some spurred by 
DOJ consent decrees pursuant to § 14141, that have created new governance 
structures that blend police and government interests with interests of citizens, 
civil-rights advocates and lawyers, and police representatives to oversee all 
facets of policing.104 In these instances, the work of local entities exercising 
citizen review takes place in parallel with DOJ monitoring, but ultimately 
supplants it once federal oversight ends.
E. COLLABORATIVE REFORM
Collaborative reform is an internal process where officers both at all levels 
of the police hierarchy and across command units pool their expertise to 
create new responses to complex crime problems. Crime problems in this 
view are contextually embedded in social and spatial contexts, where crime is 
common to a location. Crime problems may also reflect the acts of persons or 
groups, requiring a different response. In each instance, the pooled knowledge 
of multiple actors within police institutions, with diverse viewpoints and 
experience, is applied in a problem-solving process to identify tactical responses 
to crime problems. Cincinnati adopted a collaborative model in response to 
civil-rights litigation over use of force in the early 2000s.105 The current model 
has now been in practice for close to a decade.106 Reception by the police has 
been positive, and the core tenets of the model—“problems are dilemmas to be 
engaged in and learned from”—are deeply embedded in the police culture.107 
103. See, e.g., People v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0364, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364 at *19–
*20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001) (upholding attorney general’s parens patriae authority where legal 
standards and practical difficulties made it unlikely that individual victims of police misconduct 
could secure the sort of systemic, prophylactic injunctive relief sought); see also Jay L. Himes, 
State Parens Patriae Authority: The Evolution of the State Attorney General General’s Authority 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript).
104. J.B. Wogan, The New, More Powerful Wave of Civilian Oversight of Police, GOVERNING, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-civilian-oversight-oakland-
seattle.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see also JOSEPH DE ANGELIS, RICHARD ROSENTHAL & BRIAN 
BUCHNER, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
VARIOUS MODELS (2016).
105. Sabel & Simon, supra note 100, at 193.
106. See Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 
5, 2002), available at http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/department-references/collaborative-
agreement/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see also In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 400 
(S.D. Ohio 2002).
107. Collaborative Agreement, supra note 106, at 2.
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The generalizable lesson from Cincinnati’s experience, which has been closely 
monitored and studied by legal and social-science scholars, is the importance 
of creating an integrated organizational design that shares expertise and 
problem-solving responsibility among officers across ranks and commands, 
and instantiates this ethos throughout the police organization. This is a sharp 
departure from the traditional hierarchical and centralized decision-making 
and strategic planning models in contemporary police institutions. The reform 
process also illustrates a principle of “duty of responsible administration,” 
where a comprehensive restructuring is a predicate to meaningful and effective 
reform.108 These are not simple reforms, but these experiments are substantive 
changes to the New Policing models of centralized and aggressive intervention 
that seem to create harm with little to show for it.
F. MITIGATING HARM
The New Policing has several liabilities, beyond those illustrated in this 
chapter. First, there have been 25 investigations into law-enforcement agencies 
conducted since 2009 by the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ’s Civil Rights 
Division (CRD) under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.109 The CRD is currently enforcing 19 
agreements—including 14 consent decrees and one post-judgment order—in 
counties and state agencies.110 Since the inception of “pattern and practice” 
interventions in the 1990s, a total of 40 police agencies have entered into 
either stipulated settlements or consent decrees, committing local police to a 
series of court-supervised structural and policy reforms.111 Three others are 
in negotiation now, in Ferguson, Baltimore and Chicago, but it is uncertain 
whether they will be implemented by the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions.112 This all has taken place in the era of the New Policing, with its 
aggressive approach to less serious crimes and signs of social disorder. 
108. Sabel & Simon, supra note 100, at 201.
109. Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.
gov/crt/special-litigation-section-cases-and-matters0#police (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
110. Id.
111. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE 
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 3 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download; 
see also Goldie Taylor, More than 20 U.S. Cities are Currently under a DOJ Consent Decree, But 
do They Really Work?, BLUE NATION REV. (May 27, 2015), http://archives.bluenationreview.com/
more-than-20-u-s-cities-are-currently-under-a-doj-consent-decree-but-do-they-really-work/. 
112. Lichtblau, supra note 102; see also Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Didn’t Read DOJ’s Chicago 
Police Report—But He Thinks It’s “Ancedotal,” HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/jeff-sessions-doj-police_us_58b4a2eae4b060480e0b1ce6.
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Second, there is no reliable evidence of its overall effectiveness in reducing 
crime. In fact, recent studies suggest that policing models that redirect attention 
from policing disorder and focus instead on indications of actual and more 
serious crime have stronger crime-reduction effects.113 Under the New Policing, 
the yield for public safety is low if these low-level crimes or signs of disorder 
are not gateways to violence or major property crimes. More important, the 
standard of proof there is intrinsically low. In a succession of Supreme Court 
cases in recent years, the reasonable-suspicion standard has expanded to include 
pretextual stops (U.S. v. Whren),114 neighborhood characteristics (Illinois v. 
Wardlow),115 “honest mistakes” leading to unlawful stops and arrests (Herring v. 
U.S.),116 and unlawful stops that lead to arrests for outstanding warrants (Utah 
v. Strieff).117 The bases of suspicion, in other words, have expanded beyond 
the capacity of courts or police agencies to effectively regulate the power to 
conduct investigative stops.
More important, the intrinsically low standard for investigative stops (and 
the arrests or summons that follow) inevitably leads to police intervention 
in inherently benign acts. This distracts police from intervening in the more 
harmful ones. It is only in the narrow shared space where suspicion of more 
serious crime overlaps with the general interest of the New Policing regimes 
that it makes sense to intervene in the benign act at a lower standard of proof, 
and the size of that shared space is part of a contentious debate. The social 
harms from undetected harmful acts—when police are distracted from more 
serious crimes to the less serious in the hope of discovering a more harmful 
act—will far outweigh any private or small-scale benefits from intervening in 
 
 
 
 
 
113. See John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police Surges on 
Crime and Arrests in New York City, 11 PLoS ONE e0157223, 10–11 (2016); see also Fagan, supra 
note 36.
114. 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (declaring that any traffic or vehicular offense or suspected traffic or 
vehicular offense is a legitimate basis for a stop, no matter how pretextual the suspected offense).
115. 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (allowing presence in a high crime area to be a factor in police 
decisions to conduct an investigative stop, without specifying the parameters of “high crime 
area”).
116. 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (allowing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when for an 
arrest is based on erroneous information or negligent error).
117. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (allowing an arrest for an outstanding warrant even if the warrant 
was discovered in an unlawful investigative stop).
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the benign acts whose connections to serious crime are tenuous at best. In 
other words, do not sweat the little stuff, and focus on more serious acts with 
more consequential public harms. This is simple regulatory algebra.118
This leads directly to the final recommendation: law enforcement and 
citizen interests are better served by a recalibration of the jurisprudential and 
operational basis for the New Policing’s standards to move them closer them to 
a Mapp’s more exacting probable-cause standard,119 and moving away from the 
more subjective reasonable-suspicion standard of Terry.120 A more workable 
and easily understood standard for regulating police use of the stop power 
would create a more comfortable space internally for police to monitor, audit, 
and regulate compliance with constitutional law as well as internal policy. And 
it can provide a standard that moves away from the subjective criteria that are 
less vulnerable to cognitive error, perceptual distortions, and social harms.121 
Secondary benefits for legitimacy and cooperation may well follow. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes the major reforms for law and policy that this 
chapter recommends:
1. Increase the specificity of the reasonable suspicion standard as the 
basis for investigative stops to more closely approximate an exacting 
probable cause standard. 
2. Institute caps on municipal revenue from traffic fines and non-traffic 
violations.
3. Strengthen indigent defense to avoid reliance on pleas to close low-
level misdemeanor cases.
4. Use race-neutral, risk-based instruments to determine pretrial release 
eligibility and to determine bail amounts.
5. Take speedy trial rules seriously by limiting the number of appearances 
for adjudication of misdemeanors.
118. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2011) (arguing that strong 
evidence is necessary to assign liability or culpability since the proof burden can affect the design 
accuracy of enforcement); see also Fagan, supra note 36.
119. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
120. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
121. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (linking the low 
seizure rates to Fourth Amendment violations in carrying out Terry stops). 
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6. Develop state-level statutes providing remedies and injunctive relief, 
including civil-rights actions by states when police are found to have 
engaged in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations.
7. Create incentives for collaborative reforms between police and 
community to revise non-productive and harmful policing strategies.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Suspect Race Frisked Unproductive 
Frisk
Use of Force Unnecessary 
Use of Force
Arrest 
Made
Black .047*** 034*** .021* .028*** - .003
(.010) (.006) (.011) (.008) (.003)
White 
Hispanic
.067*** .014**  .040*** .014**  .002
(.012) (.005) (.011) (.006) (.002)
Black 
Hispanic
.072*** .022***  .051*** .032***  .006*
(.008) (.006) (.010) (.008) (.003)
Sample 
Restriction
- If Frisked - If Force Used -
N 4,811,769 2,519,934 4,811,769 1,076,575 4,811,769 
Adj. R-sq .228 .026 .052 .024 .014
Appendix Table 1. OLS Regression of Racial Differences in Stop Outcomes, 2004-2014
Stop Outcome
Significance: * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001.
Note: Average difference in rates of stop outcomes by race, relative to the average for 
Whites and other races. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by precinct. Regressions 
include year fixed effects and controls for the reason for the stop. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by precinct. Data include all stops for 2004 through 2014. 
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Arresteda 142,596 1.08 *** 1.047 *** 1.014 ns
5.9% (.012) (.011) (.010)
Arraignedb 117,425 .832 ** .717 *** .850 **
82.4% (.062) (.058) (.064)
Adjudicated or 
Plead Guiltyc
71,795 1.386 *** 1.389 *** 1.277 ***
61.1% (.079) (.085) (.065)
Conviction 
Offensed
71,795 1.543 *** 1.453 *** 1.878 ***
Felony 9.3% (.113) (.104) (.072)
Misdemeanor 53.5%
Violation 37.2%
Sentencee 71,795 1.312 ** 0.98 ns 0.939 ns
Time served  
or no time
44.5% (.079) (.064) (.261)
Fine or Probation 42.4%
Jail or Prison 13.1%
N, % Black  Black Hispanic White Hispanic
Odds ratio is compared to White suspects. N=2,396,314 stops.   
Significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
a. The total arrests recorded were 148,880. 7,500 cases were eliminated because of duplicate 
or incomplete arrest identifiers. In addition, 146,323 cases resulted in issuance of a summons.
c. Models estimated with controls for age and gender, and fixed effects for year and 
arraignment charge. Models estimated conditional on probability of arraignment. Standard 
errors clustered by precinct.
d. Ordered logit regression of cases conditional on probability of conviction. Estimates 
control for age and gender, and fixed effects for year and arraignment charge.
e. Ordered logit based on sentences of time served, fine, probation, jail, prison conditional on 
conviction. “No time” includes conditional discharge. Models estimated based on probability 
of conviction. Controls for age and gender. Fixed effects for year and conviction charge.
b. Models estimated with controls for age and gender, and fixed effects for year and arrest 
charge. Models estimated conditional on probability of arrest or summons. Standard errors 
clustered by police precinct
Appendix Table 2. OLS Regressions on Sanction Rates for SQF Cases by Suspect Race,  
New York City, Street Stops 2009-14 (Odds Ratios, SE)
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Driver
Ticketed
Arrest 
Made
Vehicle
Searched
Contraband
 Seized
Warrant
 Arrest
Black-White  
Odds Ratio
1.354+ 1.928** 1.670** 0.744 3.241**
(Standard error) (.236) (.297) (.235) (.171) (.921)
Sample Restriction - - - If Searched If Arrested
N of Cases 11592 11592 11592 1203 951
Pseudo R-sq. 359 .063 .101 .041 .083
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. 
Significance: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by arresting 
officer. Models include controls for driver age and gender, officer assignment (patrol vs. 
traffic), indicator for two officers with extreme level of stop activity, and the reason for 
the stop. Column 4 is estimated conditional on a search occurring. Column 5 is estimated 
conditional on an arrest being made.
Stop Outcome
Appendix Table 3. Logistic Regression of Race Effects on Stop Outcomes,  
Ferguson, 2010–2013 (Odds Ratio, SE)
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